The effects of forward looking expectations of future in¯ation on equilibrium in¯ation and interest rates are examined within an imperfect information framework. Expectations of future in¯ation affect equilibrium in a manner similar to an increase in the central bank's weight on future social welfare, making it more likely an opportunistic central bank will actually deliver on its announced in¯ation targets, and output expansions can arise even if the central banker is revealed to be a low in¯ation type. The model also illustrates the channels through which in¯ation scares raise current real interest rates.
Introduction
In the standard models of discretionary monetary policy, the central bank is tempted to engineer a real economic expansion. If private agents are locked into nominal wage contracts prior to observing the current stance of policy, the central bank can generate a surprise in¯ation that produces a temporary output expansion. The wage and price adjustment models of Taylor (1979) , Rotemberg (1982) , and Calvo (1983) , however, imply that current in¯ation will depend on expectations of future in¯ation. A policy action that signals higher future in¯ation acts to increase current in¯ation, and this raises the cost of any attempt to engineer an output expansion. With most major central banks using a short-term interest rate to implement monetary policy, policy changes are immediately and widely noted in the press. Expectations about future in¯ation can respond immediately to any change in policy, affecting both current and future equilibria. This response has the potential to discipline an opportunistic central bank, helping to support a low in¯ation equilibrium. The disciplinary channel emphasized in this paper adds to a growing list of channels that suggest a more limited role for any in¯ationary bias under discretionary monetary policy. 1 Expectations of future in¯ation will be affected by current policy, however, only if current policy provides informaton about future in¯ation. To generate such an informational role, I assume the central bank`type' is unknown by the public; thus, observing current policy may affect the public's priors concerning the identity of the central bank. This approach follows the work on preference uncertainty by Backus and Drif®ll (1985) , Vickers (1986) , Cukierman and Liviatan (1991) , and Ball (1995) . The importance of preference uncertainty has been stressed recently by Briault et al. (1997) , Schaling (1997) , and Beetsma and Jensen (1998) . The form of uncertainty emphasized in this paper is particularly relevant when the head of a central bank changes or a new institution is launched (such as the European Central Bank) whose commitment to an announced promise of low in¯ation may be doubted, or at least untested. Uncertainty about future policy is shown in in¯uence the decision problem faced by current policy makers; skepticism about a future central banker's commitment to low in¯ation forces the current central banker to raise real interest rates.
Perhaps closest in spirit to the present paper are the recent papers by Goodhart and Huang (1998) and Herrendorf (1998) . In both, observations on current policy can also discipline the central bank, but the mechanisms are quite different. Goodhart and Huang incorporate real output persistence, overlapping multiperiod nominal wage contracts, and a lag between policy actions and their effects on the economy. These last two factors imply that current policy actions have a muted impact on the economy, since some nominal wages will be renegotiated before actual in¯ation can affect real output. While this does not change the basic nature of the in¯ation bias under discretion, it does reduce the absolute magnitude of the bias. This channel also operates in the present model, but the emphasis is on a second channel that is absent in the Goodhart and Huang model. Wage and price setting behavior based on forward looking expectations alters the nature of the equilibrium, and, for some parameter values, even implies lower than expected in¯ation may generate an economic expansion. Thus, output expansions can occur when a central banker is revealed to be strong on in¯ation. Goodhart and Huang also emphasize the role of uncertainty arising from underlying economic disturbances, and announcements do not play a role in their analysis. In contrast, I focus on the public's uncertainty about the central bank's committment to its announced in¯ation targets. As Briault et al. (1997) stress, uncertainty about the central bank's preferences can be important in in¯uencing in¯ation expectations.
Herrendorf (1998) considers chisel-proof trigger strategies (al-Nowaihi and Levine, 1994) in a model with a monopoly union and imperfect information about the central bank's actual choice of policy. He shows that publicly announced in¯ation targets alleviate this informational problem by making deviations from the low in¯ation equilibrium apparent. In contrast, I assume the central bank's policy setting (for example, the value of the short-term interest rate used to implement policy) is directly observable; thus the public has perfect information about any change in monetary policy. Instead, imperfect information about the type of central banker is emphasized, and, because the public is assumed to be atomistic, equilibrium is Bayesian rather than based on trigger strategies.
In the next section, the basic model is presented. Section 3 characterizes equilibria in the model. Forward looking expectations are shown to affect the nature of the equilibria in a manner similar to the central bank's discount factor. Thus, the discipline provided by forward looking expectations forces the central bank to behave as if it were more patient. Section 4 examines the model's implications for long-term (two period) real and nominal interest rates. The model illustrates what Goodfriend (1993) has characterized as`the in¯ation scare problem'. A rise in expected future in¯ation (caused in this model by an exogenous change in the public's prior beliefs about the next central banker) forces the current central banker to raise real interest rates. Conclusions are contained in Section 5.
The model
The basic model is a variant of one developed by Cukierman and Liviatan (1991) . Their model is modi®ed in two ways. First, forward looking expectations are incorporated. Second, the framework is extended beyond the two-period version employed by Cukierman and Liviatan. In this section, these aspects of the model structure are discussed.
In¯ation and output
The literature that has developed from the original Barro±Gordon (1983a) model has been based on a simpli®ed version of an aggregate supply relationship that takes the form y t a t À E tÀ1 t " t 1
where y is the deviation of output around the economy's equilibrium output in the absence of price surprises and supply shocks, t is the rate of in¯ation, E tÀ1 t is the expected period t in¯ation rate based on information available at t À 1, and " t is a supply or productivity disturbance. This speci®cation is normally rationalized on the basis of one-period nominal wage contracting models of the type developed by Fischer (1977) and Taylor (1979) . With nominal wages ®xed prior to the start of the period, price¯uctuations alter the ex-post real wage, employment, and output.
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A critical aspect of (1) is the presence of E tÀ1 t ; the relevant expectational variable is past expectations of current in¯ation. With this formulation it is natural to assume the central bank treats E tÀ1 t as given. In models in which only a fraction of all nominal wages are set each period and remain ®xed for several periods, workers and ®rms will be concerned with the path of in¯ation in future periods. Roberts (1995) shows that the popular adjustment models of Taylor (1979) , Rotemberg (1982), and Calvo (1983) Lucas (1972) , in which case the parameter a re¯ects the outcome of a signal extraction problem due to the inability of individual economic decision makers to distinguish contemporaneously between general in¯ation and relative price changes. Lockwood (1997) , Svensson (1997) , and Goodhart and Huang (1998) introduce persistence by including an effect of y tÀ1 on y t . common expectations augmented Phillips Curve in which current in¯ation depends upon market expectations of both current and future in¯ation. King and Watson (1996) , Yun (1996) , and Bernanke and Woodford (1997) among others, have employed in¯ation equations in which current in¯ation depends on E t t1 rather than E tÀ1 t .
To investigate the implications of assuming that wage and price decisions may be based on expectations of future in¯ation, it is useful to employ a model that allows for both one-period wage contracts (as in the standard model) and two-period wage contracts. Assume that a fraction of all workers and ®rms negotiate oneperiod nominal wage contracts at the start of each period. In the standard model, 1. The remaining 1 À fraction negotiate two-period nominal wage contracts, with one half adjusting nominal wages each period. If employment is based on realized ex-post real wages, the aggregate production function is Cobb±Douglas with labor coef®cient a L , and the future is discounted at the rate 0 < < 1, then it is shown in Appendix 1 that output will be given by 3 y t a t À 1 À kE tÀ1 t À kE t t1 2 where k 1 À =1 1 and a a L 1 =21 À a L . The parameter k then captures the relative importance of forward looking expectations. If 1, all wage contracts are set for one period at the start of each period, k 0 and the standard model (1) is obtained. If 0, all contracts last for two period and k % 0:5. 4 In this case, expectations of future in¯ation and past expectations of current in¯ation will be equally important. Equation (2) illustrates the two distinct channels through which the nature of the wage setting process affects the aggregate supply relationship. First, for given expectations, the impact of in¯ation on output, given by a, is increasing in . If only half of all ®rms are locked into nominal wages 0, the output effects of in¯ation are smaller than if all ®rms are locked in 1. 5 Because stabilization policy issues will not be the focus of this paper, (2) has been written without a disturbance term. This setup is similar to that described by Goodhart and Huang (1998) . However, they do not provide an explicit derivation of their aggregate supply equation (eq. 2, p. 383) and instead assume that two period wage contracts depend only on the in¯ation rate expected during the ®rst period of the contract. 4 With 0, k 1=1 . If for example, 0:9, then k 0:53. Roberts (1995) obtains t E t t1 y t " t for the Taylor model with two-period wage contracts (see his eq. 8, p. 979). However, in his derivation, " t À t À E tÀ1 t so that his in¯ation equation can also be written as
which is equivalent to eq. (2) of the text when all contracts last two peiods 0 and 21 À a L 1 =a L . Because he assumes high frequency data, he sets 1. McCallum (1994) criticizes price adjustment models of the form t E t1 y t as violating monetary neutrality; output can be maintained above its natural rate (i.e. y can be kept positive) by a constantly declining rate of in¯ation. Fuhrer (1994) argues that historical evidence does not allow one to speculate whether one should automatically rule out models that produce such`second degree' non-neutrality results. 5 The impact of in¯ation is to in¯ate and lowers the in¯ationary bias under discretion; this is the channel Goodhart and Huang analyze. But changes in have a second effect; they alter the relative importance of E tÀ1 t and E t t1 . This channel will turn out to have effects that alter the nature of the model's equilibrium. 6 2.2 The policy framework Following Cukierman and Liviatan (1991) , assume central banks come in two types; one type, denoted type S, always delivers on its commitments, while the other, denoted type W, pursues an opportunistic policy. Type is private information, initially known only to the actual central bank. The central banker is assumed to hold of®ce for two periods, with a new central banker chosen (by nature) in odd periods. The probability a newly chosen central banker is of type S is q. This probability is known by the public, as are k and , and this information is used by private agents in forming their expectations. Depending on the nature of the equilibrium during the central banker's ®rst period in of®ce, the private sector may, in period 2, update its estimate of the probability that a type S is in of®ce. Assuming new central bankers are drawn from a stationary distribution, the probability that a type S is chosen in the ®rst period of each new term is always equal to q.
Most central banks employ interest rate oriented operating procedures, with the underlying transmission mechanism running from interest rates to real aggregate spending (via an IS relationship) to in¯ation (via an expectations augmented Phillips Curve). In Section 4, interest rates, a term structure relationship, and a simple IS relationship will be introduced to study the interest rate implications of the model. It simpli®es the exposition, however, to initially follow the standard approach in the literature and treat in¯ation as if it were the central bank's choice variable. Thus, for the remainder of this section and Section 3, policy is assumed to involve the direct setting of the in¯ation rate.
The underlying game between the public and the central bank evolves in a number of steps. To begin, if t is odd, nature chooses a new central banker who holds of®ce for period t and t 1; these will be referred to as periods 1 and 2. The central banker then announces a path for in¯ation over the two periods a t ; a t1 . Since a type W will always make the same announcements as would a type S, announcements do not need to be indexed by type. Following these announcements, the public forms expectations of period t in¯ation, denoted by E tÀ1 t and all one-period nominal wage contracts are set. The central bank then choses t , and, based on this new information, the public forms expectations of in¯ation for period t 1. Period t output is then realized.
Actual policy is implemented by setting in¯ation in each period to maximize the expected value of an objective function given by As will be clear below, these two channels are distinct; the value of a affects the level of in¯ation but does not enter into the conditions that determine whether a separating, pooling, or mixed strategy equilibrium arises.
for i W; S, where 0 < < 1 is the central bank's discount factor (the same for both types) and is the weight placed on in¯ation objectives (also the same for both types). Since type S can commit, it is assumed that a type S always delivers an in¯ation rate equal to the rate announced. 
Equilibria
We consider perfect Bayesian equilibria. The public's expectations formed in period t are optimal (in the sense of minimizing mean squared forecast errors) given the central bank's actions in setting period t policy, and the public updates its assessment of the probability the central bank is of type S using Bayes rule. The central bank recognizes that its choice of t will affect E t t1 . That is, in setting ®rst period policy, the central bank takes into account how the public will revise its expectations of period t 1 in¯ation once t is set. We consider stationary equilibria in which subsequent central banks behave identically (although different types may behave differently). This means that the expected outcomes in periods t; t 2; t 4; . . . will be the same. Equilibria may be pooling (with both types behaving similarly during the ®rst period in of®ce), separating (in which they behave differently so that the public is able to identify who is in of®ce), or involve a mixed strategy by type W (in which the type W mimics a type S with some probability). Because the model reduces to that of Cukieman and Liviatan (1991) when k 0, the details of the derivations of equilibrium outcomes can be kept to a minimum and can be found in Appendix 2.
Separating equilibrium
In a separating equilibrium, S and W set different in¯ation rates in period t; this reveals their identity, and the public's expectations about second period in¯ation re¯ect their knowledge of the central bank's true type. In such an equilibrium, a type W in¯ates at the one-shot discretionary rate in both periods. 
For type W, W 0; type W suffers no loss if actual in¯ation differs from announced in¯ation. For type S, S 3 I so that this type always sets actual in¯ation to its announced value. Vickers (1986) analyzes a signalling model in which types differ with respect to the parameter . Backus and Drif®ll (1986) and Ball (1995) study models in which one type always delivers a zero rate of in¯ation; announcements play no role in these models since the type S behaves non-strategically.
which, from the de®nition of a, is decreasing in the fraction of two-period contracts. This is the role of staggered contracts analyzed by Goodhart and Huang (1998) .
In contrast to a type W, a type S announces in¯ation targets at the start of period t and then adjusts policy to ensure actual in¯ation equals the announced targets. Immediately after announcements are made, the public's expectation of period t in¯ation, given that the equilibrium is separating, is
since with probability q the central bank is actually a type S, and so in¯ation will be at the announced rate a t , and with probability 1 À q, the central bank is a type W and we have seen that a type W will in¯ate at the rate d . Thus, a type S can in¯uence expectations about in¯ation through its announced target.
The optimal policy for a type S consists of announcements a t ; a t1 and actual in¯ation t ; t1 that maximize its two-period objective function, subject to i a i for i t; t 1, and the aggregate supply relationships linking output, in¯ation, and expectations. The ®rst order conditions for this problem yield (see Appendix 2)
and a t1 0 So in the ®rst period in of®ce a type S sets policy to achieve an in¯ation rate below the one-shot discretionary level d (in a separating equilibrium). In the second period, a type S delivers an in¯ation rate of zero.
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Actual outcomes for in¯ation and output are summarized in Table 1 . If k 0, all wages are set at the start of the period and for only one period, and we have the special case considered by Cukierman and Liviatan. And, as can be easily checked, a recession occurs in period t when k 0 if the central bank is actually of type S. However, if k > 0, and multi-period wage contracts are present, the output predictions of the model are more complex. What matters for output is actual in¯ation relative to a weighted sum of expected current in¯ation and ; the value of this gain, when discounted at the rate , is just offset by the lower period t output caused by a higher announced in¯ation rate for t 1 (see eq. (19)). 
expected future in¯ation (see eq. (2)). Because the public assigns some probability to the central bank being a type S, expected in¯ation in the ®rst period of of®ce E tÀ1 t is less than d , so if the central bank is a type W, actual in¯ation in period t exceeds the weighted sum of expected current in¯ation and expected future in¯ation. Thus, output expands. In the following period, in¯ation remains at the level d , and this is expected, but the public anticipates lower future in¯ation due to the possibility a type S will take over in t 2 (as long as q > 0). Thus, actual in¯ation in t 1 remains above the relevant weighted sum, and output is again greater than zero. The output gap is positive in both periods under a type W.
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It does not follow that a recession occurs under a type S. In fact, an expansion occurs in period t under a type S for all q if k ! 0:25.
10 As soon as type S reveals itself by its policy choice in period t, agents' expectation of period t 1 in¯ation falls as they know in¯ation will be zero under the type S. This decline in E t t1 is expansionary in period t as long as k > 0. Thus, if future expectations are important in current wage contract settlements, having a type S in of®ce can produce both lower in¯ation and an economic expansion in the ®rst period of a separating equilibrium.
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For the separating outcome to be an equilibrium, the type W central banker must have no incentive to derivate from it. Appendix 2 shows that a type W will derivate from the separating equilibrium if and only if
If a large weight is placed on the future ( large), then a type W will ®nd it advantageous to deviate from the separating equilibrium and mimic the behavior of a type S in the ®rst period in of®ce. This allows the type W to create a larger surprise in¯ation and output expansion in t 1. Revealing itself to be a type W in period t causes expected future in¯ation to rise, and when k > 0 this reduces the output level consistent with maintaining period t in¯ation equal to d . If this channel is important (i.e., if k is large), the central bank will not wish to separate. As (4) shows, and k affect the pro®tability of a deviation through which is increasing in both and k; a rise in the importance of forward looking wage contracts (a fall in ) plays essentially the same role as an increase in the discount It is easy to show, however, that y 1 > y 2 ; output expands more in the ®rst period of a type W's term in of®ce. 10 If :9, k > 0:25 whenever the fraction of two-period contracts, 1 À , exceeds :36. If k 0, as in the standard case, a recession occurs upon the appointment of a type S for all values of q. For 0 < k :25, expansions can occur for extreme values of q. Notice that these conditions do not depend on a, again emphasizing the two distinct channels through which k affects in¯ation outcomes. The effects operating through a affect only the size of the output effect, not its sign. 11 This result arises for the same reason Ball (1994) ®nds that credible disin¯ations may generate expansions. 12 When 1, k is equal to zero and this condition becomes > factor in affecting the incentive to derivate from a separating equilibrium. A larger k, just like a larger , makes it less likely a type W would wish to separate and makes it more likely that a type W will behave like a type S. Importantly, if all wage contracts are two period contracts 0, then k 1=1 and 1 2 = > 1; separating in period 1 is never an equilibrium strategy for the type W. Finally, note that as claimed earlier, the condition that must be satis®ed to support a separating equilibrium does not depend on a. Thus, as Goodhart and Huang showed, the presence of two period staggered contract setting can lower the one-shot discretionary equilibrium in¯ation rate, but such contracts also ensure that the type W may never actually chose to separate and in¯ate at this rate, and will not do so if all contracts are for two periods 0.
Pooling equilibrium
If eq. (4) holds, a type W would ®nd it pro®table to deviate from the separating equilibrium. In this case, there may be pooling and/or mixed strategy equilibria. In a pooling equilibrium, both types in¯ate at the same rate during the ®rst period, and, when forming expectations about second period in¯ation, the public remains uncertain about the central bank's type. In the second period of a pooling equilibrium, type W sets in¯ation equal to d as this is the last period in of®ce and reputation has no further value. Since policy in period t does not provide any information about the central bank's type, the public expects in¯ation during period t 1 to equal the announced level with probability q and the rate d with probability 1 À q; thus, E t t1 q a 2 1 À q d . From the decision problem faced by the type S in a pooling equilibrium, one can show that . In contrast to the second period of a separating equilibrium, in¯ation is positive even under a type S. The outcomes in a pooling equilibrium are summarized in Table 2 .
As in Cukierman and Liviatan (1991) , the type S is able to in¯ate at a lower rate in the pooling equilibrium than in a separating equilibrium k d < 1 À 1 À kq d , but in contrast to their results, in¯ation remains positive even with pooling. This effect arises from the role of expected future in¯ation. Since both E tÀ1 t and E t t1 matter for period t in¯ation, the announcement a 1 has a smaller effect on period t in¯ation (it is weighted by 1 À k). Thus, even though the carl e. walsh 257 Table 2 Pooling equilibrium
announcement is believed (since both types in¯ate at the announced rate in a pooling equilibrium), the type S is unable to fully affect the relevant combination of E tÀ1 t and E t t1 as the public continues to expect a positive in¯ation rate in period t 1. In¯ating at a zero rate in period t would cause a recession. In contrast, if future in¯ation does not matter (i.e., k 0), only t À E tÀ1 t is relevant for output; announcing and delivering zero in¯ation in period t does not lead to a recession. If k > 0, the in¯ation rate in the pooling equilibrium is positive and increasing in k. Both k and d depend on the parameter ; and a decrease in (more two-period contracts) raises k and decreases d . When k reaches its maximum value (when 0), k d % 1 2 d so that in¯ation in the pooling equilibrium is considerably less than would occur in a one-shot discretionary equilibrium. Both d and k d are shown as functions of k in Figure 1. 13 Again, the implications for output when k > 0 differ from those that are standard in the Barro±Gordon framework, with the ®rst period involving either an output expansion if k À 1 À q 2 > 0 or recession if k À 1 À q 2 < 0. To understand the implications for output in period t, consider a case in which q is large; the public believes it likely that the new central banker is a type S. Expected future in¯ation, equal to 1 À q 2 d , is therefore low, and this is expansionary in period t. If future expectations are important enough (as measured by k) and expected future in¯ation is low enough so that k À 1 À q 2 > 0, output will be postive in period t. Thus, a large k or a high probability of a type S can produce an 258 market discipline and monetary policy expansion in period t even though ®rst period in¯ation is anticipated correctly. A high q lowers expected second period in¯ation which is expansionary in period t.
It is more expansionary, the larger is k. A deviation from the pooling equilibrium means that the type W in¯ates in period t at a rate that differs from a 1 . The optimal deviation is to in¯ate at the oneshot discretionary rate d , and, since the public now knows a type W is in of®ce, expected in¯ation for period t 1 jumps to d . Appendix 2 shows that type W will deviate from the pooling equilibrium if and only if
Since =1 À k 2 , deviation from the pooling equilibrium is more likely if k is small (less weight on forward looking expectations), is small (less weight placed on period 2 outcomes by the central bank), or q is small (high probability of a type W). Figure 2 illustrates the combinations of and q consistent with pooling and separating for 1 k 0, the Cukierman and Liviatan case) and 0:5k 0:33. Two conclusions are immediately apparent. First, the set of discount factors and initial probabilities of type S consistent with pooling increases as falls. Thus, the greater the prevalence of multi-period wage contracts, the more likely it is that pooling results and even a type W in¯ates at a rate designed to mimic the type S. Second, the set of discount factors and initial probabilities of type S consistent with a separating equilibrium decreases as falls. If multi-period wage contracts are important, it is unlikely even an impatient type W would ®nd it advantageous to in¯ate at the one-shot discretionary rate.
A large region in the ®gure is labeled as mixed strategy equilibria. We have not yet demonstrated this, a point to which we now turn. However, there exist mixed strategy equilibria in this case. Consider the following strategy for type W in period t W t a 1 with probability P d with probability 1 À P (an event that occurs with probability P), then private agents are still unable to determine the central bank's identity, but with P < 1, observing a 1 is more likely to have occurred if the true type is actually S. Therefore, if the central bank delivers on its announced in¯ation rate, agents will update their prior probabilities using Bayes rule. If q 1 is the initial probability of a type S and q 2 is the revised probability
The type W central banker must be indifferent between picking the same in¯ation rate as type S with probability P and picking the discretionary rate d with probability 1 À P. Appendix 2 shows that this requires the probability P to satisfy a quadratic, only one solution of which satis®es the condition 0 P 1. This solution is given by
As occurred in the case of separating and pooling equilibria, the central bank's discount factor and the weight on future expectations k affect P solely through the parameter . Increases in either or k (decreases in ) increase the probability that the type W will mimic the type S in period 1. Figure 3 shows the optimal mimicking probability P as a function of q 1 for 1, 0:5 and 0. P is decreasing in ; fewer one-period contracts and greater weight on future in¯ation increase the likelihood that a type W will mimic the behavior of a type S during period 1. With expected future in¯ation playing a larger role, the cost to a type W of revealing itself rises, so a type W is more likely to mimic the behavior of a type S. As the ®gure also shows, the optimal probability of mimicking is increasing in the initial probability that a type S will be selected. If the public attaches a high prior probability to the central bank being a type S, expected in¯ation will be low and a type W has a larger incentive to mimic the behavior of a type S.
Implications
The model has several interesting implications. The dependence of the conditions for determining whether the equilibrium is separating, pooling or mixed strategy on the parameter =1 À k 2 implies that forward looking market expectations play much the same role as the central bank's discount factor. Even a type W central bank who places little weight on future outcomes (i.e. has a low ) may ®nd it advantageous to mimic the type S central bank if k is large. In that sense, the market forces the type W to be patient. Because revealing oneself as a type W has a cost in the form of higher expected future in¯ation, the public's response to policy serves to discipline deviations from the policies of a type S. Thus, type W central banks are unlikely to separate, at least not with certainty. Even moderate values of k make the separating equilibrium unlikely and imply a quite high probability that the type W will mimic in a mixed strategy equilibrium. If forward looking expectations are important, then, market discipline may serve to constrain the behavior of the central bank, forcing the central bank to`do the right thing' as argued by McCallum (1995 McCallum ( , 1997 .
14 A second implication is that the standard prediction that a recession occurs under a type S is not robust when expectations respond to current instrument settings and expected future in¯ation affects current in¯ation. If period 1 policy causes the public to reduce the in¯ation rate they expect in period 2, this can offset the otherwise contractionary impact of a low in¯ation policy in period 1. The effect of forward looking expectations is to make more immediate the credibility bene®ts that are gained from having a type S setting policy. If this effect is strong enough, output can actually rise when the public perceives that the central banker is a type S. 
Interest rates and the`in¯ation scare problem'
In the previous section, in¯ation was treated as the direct policy instrument of the central bank. This approach is common, but central banks typically operate using a short-term nominal interest rate as their instrument of monetary policy. Because of the simple structure of the model, the equilibrium values of output and in¯ation could be determined without speci®cally deriving the implied values for interest rates. It is useful to introduce interest rates explicitly into the analysis, however, to examine how they respond to information about the central bank type.
The one-period nominal interest rate, denoted by i t , is now assumed to be the central bank's policy instrument. Output is assumed to be related through an IS relationship to a longer term real rate of interest, with variations in the policy rate affecting output through the term structure of interest rates. To maintain an analytically simple framework, the long rate is taken to be a two-period expected real rate of interest. In this case y t ÀbR t 8 where R is de®ned by
The corresponding two-period nominal rate of interest is de®ned by
Through its choice of i t , and the public's expectations about in¯ation and future policy, the central bank in¯uences aggregate spending through the IS relationship. Movements in output, together with expectations, then affect in¯ation through an expectations augmented Phillips Curve, which, in the present model, is obtained by rewriting eq. (2) in the form t 1 À kE tÀ1 t kE t t1 a À1 y t
Marvin Goodfriend (1993) has provided an interpretation of Federal Reserve policy in terms of what he describes as the`in¯ation scare problem'. According to Goodfriend, the Fed was, at several times, faced with increases in long-term interest rates that re¯ected increases in expected future in¯ation. To counteract this rise in expected in¯ation, and maintain actual in¯ation at targeted levels, the Fed was forced to raise short-term real rates. In the context of Europe, reduced con®dence that the European Central Bank will maintain low in¯ation could generate a similar in¯ation scare problem. This phenomena can be illustrated in the present model by considering the impact on interest rates of an exogenous shift in the public's assessment of future monetary policy. This could occur if the public's priors over the likely type of a future central banker were to change. An in¯ation scare 15 Recall that y is an output gap measure, so R is interpreted as the deviation from the real rate consistent with a zero output gap. Kerr and King (1996) , Nelson (1997), and Walsh (1998) develop IS relationships in which E t y t1 appears, thus generating another channel through which expectations affect the current equilibrium. problem may arise if there is a rise in the perceived probability that the next central banker will be a type W; this corresponds to a fall in q 1 .
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Suppose a new central banker is appointed in period t. The real interest rate during the second period of the central banker's term can be written as
where E t1 t2 denotes the expectation, formed during the second period of the current central banker's term of of®ce, of in¯ation during the ®rst period of the next central banker's term. The impact on R t1 of a change in q 1 is given by
The exact expression for @E t1 t2 =@q 1 will depend on the nature of the equilibrium. In a mixed strategy equilibrium, E t1 t2
All three terms in (12) are non-positive, contributing to higher expected in¯a-tion if q 1 falls. The ®rst term re¯ects the effect of a change in q 1 on the probability that the in¯ation rate a 1 rather than d will occur in the following period. Since a 1 < d , a fall in q 1 makes a 1 less likely and so increases expected future in¯ation. This can be thought of as the direct channel; since a type S in¯ates at a lower rate than a type W, an increased probability of a type W will raise expected in¯ation. Indirect effects operate as well since a change in q 1 will affect the in¯ation rate a type S would pick and the probability a type W will mimic a type S. The second term in (12) arises because a change in the public's assessment that a type S is in of®ce affects the in¯ation rate a type S ®nds it optimal to announce for the ®rst period in of®ce. Announcements have less of an effect on expectations when q 1 is small, and eq. (23) shows that a 1 decreases with q 1 . Finally, the third term in (12) re¯ects the impact of q 1 on the optimal probability of mimicking. From (7), this probability is increasing in q 1 . A fall in q 1 therefore decreases the probability a type W will in¯ate at the rate a 1 rather than at the rate d ; this raises expected future in¯ation. All three channels operate to increase expected future in¯ation if q 1 decreases; thus, from (11), a fall in the probability a type S will be appointed (a reduction in q 1 ) forces the current central banker (regardless of type) to raise the real rate of interest.
The effect of a fall in q 1 on the two-period nominal interest rate I t1 depends on the effect on the two-period real rate and on any change in expected future in¯ation The nominal rate moves more than the real rate since a change in q 1 causes expected future in¯ation to change in the same direction as the current real rate; a fall in q 1 increases R t1 and expected future in¯ation. @E t1 t2 =@q 1 has already been derived in equation (12); @E t1 t3 =@q 1 equals the effect of a change in q 1 on the time t 1 expectation of period t 3 in¯ation. Period t 3 represents the second period in of®ce of the central banker appointed at time t 2. E t1 t3 increases with a fall in the prior probability future policy will be conducted by a type S central banker, with the same three channels discussed above operatng. Since a type W is likely to in¯ate at a higher rate, an increased probability of a type W directly raises expected in¯ation. A fall in q 1 also makes it less likely a type W will attempt to mimic a type S, and this further raises expected in¯ation. Finally, a fall in q 1 affects the in¯ation rate that a type S will pick, so that the in¯ation expected even if a type S is appointed rises. These direct and indirect effects raise the in¯ation premium incorporated into the twoperiod nominal rate. They are reinforced by the effect of a change in q 1 on the expected two-period real interest rate. Thus, in¯ation scares raise nominal interest rates by increasing both expected real returns and expected future in¯ation.
Conclusions
The speci®c model analyzed here focused on the presence of forward looking expectations in the aggregate supply relationship due to the presence of twoperiod nominal wage contracts. This provided a convenient means of developing a comparison with the standard spec®cation in terms of the single parameter k.
Expectations of future in¯ation responded to current policy because today's policy decisions potentially reveal information about the central bank, causing private agents to change their expectations concerning future in¯ation. If the parameter k is related to the relative proportions of one-period and two-period wage contracts, an increase in the importance of multi-period contracts both reduces the one-shot discretionary in¯ation rate (as Goodhart and Huang showed) and makes it more likely a weak central bank will mimic a strong central bank.
The implications for output movements were found to be much richer than in the standard model. Economic expansions and low in¯ation may co-exist if the central bank is revealed to be committed to ful®lling its announced in¯ation targets. Consistent with Goodfriend's notion of in¯ation scares, a rise in expected future in¯ation forces the central bank to raise current real interest rates. Thus, uncertainty over future policy, such as may occur while Europe waits to see how the ECB will conduct policy, can force policy makers to alter their current policy stance.
Several extensions of the model would be worth exploring. First, the framework could be modi®ed to incorporate a role for stabilization and exogenous non-policy disturbances. A second extension would involve generalizing the treatment of the term of of®ce. Waller and Walsh (1996) have shown how the relationship between the central banker's term of of®ce and the weight placed on in¯ation objectives (Rogoff 's degree of conservatism) can interact to affect¯uctuations in real economic activity. The assumption of a ®xed, nonrenewable two-period term of of®ce simpli®ed the present analysis, but it would be interesting to pursue the role reappointment might play in affecting the conduct of policy.
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